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Abstract
In this paper we highlight a specific mechanism through which social networks
help in job search. We characterize the strength of a network by its likelihood of
providing a job offer. Using a theoretical model we show that the wage differential
in jobs found using networks versus those found using formal channels, decreases
as the network becomes stronger. We verify this result for recent immigrants to
Canada for whom a strong network is captured by the presence of a ‘close tie.’
Furthermore, structural estimates confirm that the presence of a close tie operates
by increasing the likelihood of generating a job offer from the network rather than
by altering the wage distribution from which an offer is drawn.
Key words: Job Search, Migration, Networks
JEL Codes: J3
1 Introduction
Social networks have long been viewed as reservoirs of information that help match
job seekers with vacancies (Ioannides and Loury 2004; Calvo-Armengol and Jack-
son 2004, 2007).1 In a review of literature spanning the last three decades, covering
the United States and other countries, Topa (2011) notes that at least half of all jobs
are typically found through informal contacts. While the importance of networks
in job search has been firmly established, not much is known about the channels
through which they operate. We show that in the case of very recent immigrants
to Canada, effective networks operate by providing a greater number of job offers
rather than by altering the type of offers.
Drawing on Montgomery (1992), we model the effect of increasing the like-
lihood of receiving a job offer from the network. We derive the counter-intuitive
implication that observed difference in wages in jobs found using networks versus
those found using formal channels decreases as network strength, defined as the
probability of generating a job offer, increases. Put differently, the network wage
premium decreases with network strength. That this result holds even when we al-
low the network and formal wage offer distributions to differ from each other, and
that it holds not just at the mean but also at most percentiles, are novel contributions
of this paper.
We test the predictive value of our model for a nationally representative survey
of recent immigrants to Canada. In the data, a strong network is captured using
the presence of at least one ‘close tie’ (relative or friend) in Canada at the time
of entry. Employing a difference-in-differences approach we confirm our model’s
implications. As an additional check, we estimate a structural model to uncover the
underlying network and formal wage-offer distributions and offer probabilities. The
parameter estimates confirm that the presence of a close tie operates by increasing
the likelihood of generating an offer from the network rather than by altering the
1Other roles of social networks have included acting as collateral in credit markets (Karlan et
al 2009), providing insurance against income shocks (Ambrus et al 2014; Kinnan and Townsend
2012; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2016), and overcoming moral hazard (Dhillon et al 2014; Jackson
and Schneider 2011).
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distribution from which this offer is drawn.
Although the situation of recent immigrants to Canada is unlikely to be unique,
we make no claim that all networks work in the manner that we describe. Our
setting may differ because newly arrived immigrants to Canada, although gener-
ally well-educated, may be impatient to find some employment quickly. Networks
may play a quite different role for more established immigrants or for natives. Fur-
ther, we are agnostic about whether networks provide better (or worse) offers. Our
model’s predictions hold irrespective of the type of jobs networks provide. This is
especially noteworthy since the empirical literature is divided on this point. Some
find that networks help overcome adverse selection or improve match productiv-
ity leading to higher starting wages for workers hired using referrals (Brown et
al 2016; Damm 2009; Dustmann et al 2015; Hensvik and Skans 2016; Schmutte
2015a). Others such as Aslund and Skans (2010) and Bentolila et al (2010) find a
wage penalty associated with the use of networks. A third set finds mixed results
regarding whether the use of networks results in a penalty or a premium: in Beamen
2012, it depends on the vintage of the network, while in Pellizzari 2010, it depends
on the efficiency of the formal channels.
There is a small but developing body of work that examines the mechanisms
through which networks operate in the labor market. In Dustmann et al 2015, a
referred worker’s firm-specific productivity is less uncertain than that of a worker
hired through formal (impersonal) channels. Consequently, referred workers earn
higher wages and are less likely to leave the firm. The authors find support for
this hypothesis using matched employer-employee data from Germany. Schmutte
(2015b) develops a model in which the intensity with which referrals are used is
endogenously determined and exhibits a non-monotonic relation with labor market
tightness. Additionally, whether referrals get converted to jobs is inversely related
to the intensity of use of referrals. He verifies this last prediction using data from
the United States.2 We add to this growing body of literature.
The empirical literature has measured networks in different ways. Some papers
2Some other recent papers that combine theory with empirical evidence to study how networks
operate include Beaman and Magruder (2012), Hensvik and Skans (2016) and Schmutte (2015a).
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emphasize the spatial dimension of networks (Hellerstein et al. 2011; Hellerstein
et al. 2014). Topa and Zenou (2015) define networks using a common social space
based on race, ethnicity, age, nationality, tastes and other attributes, and recognize
that there may be an overlap between physical and social space. Others focus on
the workplace and use co-workers to define a network (Cingano and Rosolia 2012;
Glitz 2015; Weber et al 2014). In developing countries networks have been charac-
terized using community-based ties; for example, Munshi (2011) defines networks
in India along caste lines. Immigrant networks have traditionally been defined along
ethnic or country of origin dimensions (Borjas 2000; Patacchini and Zenou 2012;
Patel and Vella 2013).
Granovetter (1973) and later Boorman (1975) distinguish between strong and
weak social ties. The former consist of family members and close friends, and
the latter of acquaintances or friends of friends. Recent papers that have looked
at the different effects of these two types of ties obtain mixed results. Kuzubas
and Szabo (2015) study unemployed workers in Indonesia and find that they are
more likely to search through their strong ties when the ethnic network is either
very small or very large. In addition, those who find their job using strong ties earn
less than others due to lower match quality. Using Swedish data on young labor
market entrants, Kramarz and Skans (2014) find an important role for strong ties
captured using parental networks. Young workers appear to benefit from shorter
transitions into the first jobs and better labor market outcomes after a few years
into the job. Giulietti et al (2014) look at rural to urban migration in China and
find that strong and weak ties act as complements in influencing the decision to
migrate. Keeping this rich literature in mind, in Goel and Lang (2009), we tested the
empirical validity of two different measures of network strength: a) the traditional
(weak ties) measure consisting of persons from the immigrant’s country of origin
living in his locality, and b) the presence of close ties captured by at least one
relative or friend in Canada at the time of entry.3 We find that the former does not
satisfy basic conditions (discussed in section 3) to be a valid proxy for network
3The data does not specify who the relative is. It could be a close relative like one’s spouse or a
distant one.
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strength, while the close ties measure does. In this paper, we therefore use close
ties to capture network strength.
2 Theoretical Model
Our model draws on Montgomery (1992). He considers a worker who receives job
offers from two sources to which we refer as ‘the worker’s network’ and ‘formal
channels.’ Montgomery characterizes the two sources by the same wage-offer dis-
tribution. He then shows that the mean wage conditional on having accepted an
offer from the network is lower than the mean wage conditional on having accepted
one from the formal channels, if and only if, the average number of offers from the
network is greater than the average number of offers from formal channels. This
initially counter-intuitive result is actually quite intuitive. As Montgomery explains,
suppose the formal channels almost never generate an offer while the network al-
most always yields an offer. Then almost all workers receive an offer from the net-
work, but very few also receive one from formal channels. Therefore, ex post, those
who accepted an offer from formal channels almost definitely chose the best of two
offers, while those who accepted an offer from the network almost all chose the one
offer they had. Consequently, on average, even though the network is stronger than
the formal channels, those in jobs found through formal channels have higher wages
than those in jobs found through the network. We extend Montgomery’s model to
allow the network and formal channels to have different wage-offer distributions.
Our extension is important because, as discussed in the introduction, previous stud-
ies have highlighted various reasons for these offer distributions to differ in either
direction. Our model allows for either possibility. We now describe our model in
detail.
Consider a new entrant looking for a job. He has two sources of job offers, his
network and formal channels. We simplify Montgomery’s model by limiting the
number of potential wage-offers from each source to at most one. Given that we
apply our model to recent immigrants who have been in the host country for only
about six months, we believe that this assumption is not unduly restrictive. Few
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will have received multiple offers through a single mechanism.4 We adopt a single-
period static framework to model search for the new entrant’s first job. This allows
us to easily model the possibility that a subset of new entrants will simultaneously
hold multiple offers (two in our model) when searching for their first job, something
that is much more difficult to capture in a continuous time framework. Further, we
use a static model because recent immigrants are likely to be very impatient when
it comes to transitioning into first jobs. Consistent with the fact that two-thirds of
our sample of immigrants are heads of households, we see little evidence that they
are turning down offers or targeting relatively high-wage jobs. While in a standard
sequential search model we would have to allow the arrival rate of offers to affect the
reservation wage, here we assume that all new entrants have the same reservation
wage which is equated to their value of leisure (normalized to zero).5 In section 6,
we discuss how endogenizing the reservation wage would affect our results.
Wage offers rain down upon a new entrant. With probability pn he receives an
offer from his network, and with probability pf he receives one from formal chan-
nels. pn characterizes the strength of his network. The higher the value of pn, the
stronger is his network. Let Fn(w) and Ff (w) denote the wage offer distributions
of the network and formal sources, respectively. Both are defined over the positive
real line.6 If a worker receives only one offer, he accepts it; if he receives two offers
(one from each source), he chooses the higher of the two; and if he receives no
offers, he remains unemployed.
The mean wage conditional on receiving at least one offer is,
E(wjN  1) = pf (1  pn)E(wf ) + pn(1  pf )E(wn) + pfpnE(wjN = 2)
(pf + pn   pfpn) : (1)
4As an admittedly imperfect test of this hypothesis we looked at data on job turnover within six
months since arrival in Canada. Only 15 percent of recent immigrants had worked in two jobs since
arrival, and only 4 percent in three or more jobs. Moreover, 31 percent of recent immigrants had
never been employed throughout the first six months since arrival.
5Similarly to Burdett and Mortensen (1998), in our model workers always accept the first offer
they receive if they receive a single offer, although departing from that model we allow for the
possibility that a worker may hold two offers simultaneously while not employed.
6There is no loss of generality from ignoring negative wage offers that all workers would reject.
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where N is the number of offers received, and, E(wf ) and E(wn) are the means
of the formal and the network wage-offer distributions, respectively. Note that
improvements in either the network strength, pn, or the offer probability of the
formal channels, pf ; could lower the mean wage conditional on being employed,
E(wjN  1). For example, if most network offers are lower than formal offers, an
increase in network strength could lower the mean wage among those employed.
Of course, if we account for unemployed individuals, a higher probability of either
type of offer must make workers better off, an auxiliary prediction that we confirm
in the results section.
The mean wage conditional on having accepted an offer received through the
network is,
E(wjn) = (1  pf )E(wn) + pf Pr(wn > wf )E(wnjwn > wf )
(1  pf ) + pf Pr(wn > wf ) (2)
which is independent of network strength, pn. This is because, for a fixed dis-
tribution, the mean value of a draw from the distribution does not depend on the
probability of getting to make the draw. Similarly, the mean wage conditional on
having accepted an offer from the formal channels is,
E(wjf) = (1  pn)E(wf ) + pn Pr(wf > wn)E(wf jwf > wn)
(1  pn) + pn Pr(wf > wn)
which is increasing in pn. It follows that the difference between the mean wage
conditional on employment in a job found through the network and the mean wage
conditional on employment in a job found through formal channels (the mean net-
work wage premium), is decreasing in network strength, pn.
2.1 Effect at Percentiles of the Observed Wage Distributions
Our argument applies equally to percentiles of the observed wage distributions. To
show this we first establish the following proposition in which we show that the
c.d.f. of the observed formal wage distribution, Ff (wjf), is decreasing in network
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strength, pn: For simplicity we assume that the formal and network wage distribu-
tions have a common support. The result goes through mutatis mutandis if they do
not.
Proposition 1 Let Ff (wjf); the observed formal wage distribution, be continuous
on [a; b] with Ff (ajf) = 0 and Ff (bjf) = 1: Then d(Ff (wjf))=dpn < 0 for a <
w < b and d(Ff (wjf))=dpn = 0 for w = a; b:
Proof. As defined earlier, let Fn(w) and Ff (w) be the wage-offer distributions of
the network and formal sources, respectively. Let fn(w) and ff (w) be the corre-
sponding offer densities. Then the c.d.f. of the observed formal wage distribution,
Ff (wjf); (i.e. the distribution conditional on having accepted a formal offer), is
given by,
Ff (wjf) =
R w
a
(1  pn + pnFn(x))ff (x)dxR b
a
(1  pn + pnFn(x))ff (x)dx
=
Ff (w) 
R w
a
pn(1  Fn(x))ff (x)dx
1  R b
a
pn(1  Fn(x))ff (x)dx
d
dpn
 
Ff (w) 
R w
a
pn(1  Fn(x))ff (x)dx
1  R b
a
pn(1  Fn(x))ff (x)dx
!
=
R w
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dx  Ff (w)
R b
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dx
1  R b
a
pn(1  Fn(x))ff (x)dx
2
Inspection of the numerator proves that d(Ff (wjf))=dpn = 0 for w = a; b: Next,
consider R w
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dxR b
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dx
=
R w
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dxR w
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dx+
R b
w
Fn(x)ff (x)dx
From the first mean value theorem of integration, there exists weights !1:and !2,
such that
R w
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dxR b
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dx
=
!1Ff (w)
!1Ff (w) + !2(1  Ff (w))
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where
0 < !1 < Fn(w) < !2 < 1
for a < w < b: It follows thatR w
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dxR b
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dx
< Ff (w)
Therefore,
dFf (wjf)
dpn
=
R w
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dx  Ff (w)
R b
a
Fn(x)ff (x)dx
1  R b
a
pn(1  Fn(x))ff (x)dx
2 < 0:
The proposition establishes that except for the highest and lowest wages, the
percentile associated with any wage of the observed formal wage distribution is
reduced when network strength increases. The intuition is straightforward. Any
network offer beats a formal offer if it is greater than the formal offer, but it has
no effect on the acceptance of formal offers above it. Most network offers will
beat a very low formal offer, but not a very high one. On average, therefore, a
network offer reduces the probability that the worker accepts a low formal offer by
more than it reduces the probability that the worker accepts a high formal offer.
The observed formal wage distribution shifts to the right. On the other hand, the
c.d.f. of the observed network wage distribution, Fn(wjn), is independent of pn;
because, conditional on receiving a network offer, the probability that the offer will
be better than a formal offer is independent of pn. We, therefore, have the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 The difference between any percentile (except the highest and the low-
est percentiles) of the observed network wage distribution and the same percentile
of the observed formal wage distribution decreases as network strength increases.
This result, which has not been discussed in previous literature, suggests a
potentially more powerful test of the model: since there is no effect of network
8
strength on the network premium at the highest and lowest percentiles, there must
be some percentile at which the effect is larger than it is at the mean. We used
simulations to get a sense of where the effect of network strength is likely to be the
largest. We assumed that both the network and the formal log wage distributions
are normal with zero mean, and chose offer probabilities to match the proportions
in the data of those never employed; in formal jobs; and in network jobs. We found
that across nineteen equidistant percentiles (ranging from the 5th to the 95th), when
the standard deviations for both distributions are equal, the largest effect on the
network premium of an increase in network strength is at the 25th percentile. For
other plausible ratios of the standard deviations (ranging from 0:5 to 2), we found
that the largest effect lies within the 10th to 30th percentile range. Based on these
simulations, we expect that as network strength increases, the decrease in network
premium should be highest below the median and probably somewhere around the
first three deciles.7 Note that in all simulations, some fraction of workers remains
unemployed, but as in the empirical work, we are concerned about the distribution
of observed wages.
2.2 Summary of Predictions
In our setup where a worker can receive at most one offer from each source, and
where the network and formal wage-offer distributions may be different, the model
has the following predictions:
1. The mean of the observed network wage distribution is independent of net-
work strength.
2. The mean of the observed formal wage distribution is increasing in network
strength.
3. Conditional on being employed, the mean network wage premium is decreas-
ing in network strength (follows from predictions 1 and 2).
7Detailed results from these preliminary simulations can be made available on request.
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4. The difference between any percentile (except the highest and the lowest per-
centiles) of the observed network wage distribution and the same percentile
of the observed formal wage distribution is decreasing in network strength.
Predictions (3) and (4) are the main testable predictions of our model. As dis-
cussed in the next section, compared to predictions (1) and (2), the empirical frame-
work to test predictions (3) and (4) is more robust to concerns about unmeasured
differences between individuals with strong and weak networks.
3 Empirical Framework
Our empirical measure of network strength is the presence of a close tie which is
closely related to the concept of strong ties used in sociology (Granovetter 1973).
In the data, close tie (CT ) is a binary variable. It refers to whether the recent
immigrant had at least one relative or friend already living in Canada when he first
arrived. CT = 1 if he reports that he had at least one such social tie; otherwise
CT = 0. Note that we refer to this measure in the singular (as close tie and not
close ties), even though the immigrant may have had more than one such social tie.
Validation of Close Tie as a measure of Network Strength: Recall that our theo-
retical concept of network strength is the probability of receiving a wage-offer from
the network. Network strength should therefore be associated with a higher proba-
bility of being in a job found through the immigrant’s network, a lower probability
of being in a job found through the formal channels, and a lower probability of
never having been employed since arrival in Canada. In addition, if we assign a
very low wage to those who have never been employed, the measure should also
be associated with higher wages: stronger networks should make workers better
off. These predictions probably apply to a wide class of models and are not specific
to our characterization of a strong network. Nevertheless, it is important to check
that they hold in data because if they don’t, it implies that our empirical measure of
network strength is not valid.
We use multinomial logit to examine how close tie, CT , is associated with the
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three job search outcomes, namely, never employed since arrival, u; found first job
through the network, nj; and found first job through formal channels, fj. The
log-odds ratio for this regression is given by,
ln
P lijk
P uijk
= l0 + 
l
1CTijk + 
l
2Xijk + !
1l
j + 
1l
k (3)
where the subscripts refer to immigrant i, country of birth j, and area of residence
k; l 2 fnj; fjg, X is a set of additional controls that is likely to influence the
search outcome; and !1j and 1k are country of birth and area of residence dummies,
respectively.
To look at the association between close tie and wages, we estimate a set of
quantile wage regressions that include those who have never been employed since
arrival. The regression specification is given by,
lnw0ijk = 0 + 1CTijk + 2Xijk + !
2
j + 
2
k + ijk: (4)
where w0 is the wage in the immigrant’s first job if he was ever employed after
arrival, and it is an assigned low wage if he was never employed during that time.
The remaining variables are defined as in equation (3) above. For CT to be a valid
measure of network strength, 1 must be positive.
To preview the results, close tie satisfies the conditions to be considered a valid
measure of network strength.
Network Premium and Close Tie: After having validated our measure of net-
work strength, we test our model’s main implication: that the network wage pre-
mium decreases in network strength. To do this, we consider immigrants who were
employed at least once after arrival, and look at (log) wages in their first job. Un-
like equation (4), we exclude immigrants never employed after arrival. OLS is used
to test the implication at the mean, while quantile regressions are used to test it at
the nine deciles. We estimate a standard Mincerian wage equation augmented with
the close tie variable (CT ), the network job variable (NJ) and these two variables
interacted. NJ is a binary measure of whether the immigrant found his first job
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through his network: NJ = 1 if the first job was found using his network, and
NJ = 0 if it was found using the formal channels. The equation we estimate is
given by the following difference-in-differences specification,
lnwijk = 0+1CTijk+2NJijk+3(NJijkCTijk)+4Xijk+!3j+3k+ ijk (5)
where, conditional on being employed at least once since arrival, w is the wage in
the immigrant’s first job in Canada.
Following section 2.2, the main predictions of our model are:
1. 1+ 3 = 0: The observed network wage is independent of network strength.
2. 1 > 0: The observed formal wage is increasing in network strength.
3. 3 < 0: Conditional on being employed, the network wage premium is de-
creasing in network strength.
1 might be positive for reasons unrelated to a higher probability of receiving
a network offer. If, for example, immigrants with a close tie are positively (nega-
tively) selected than those without a close tie, then 1 could be spuriously positive
(negative). Essentially the same concerns apply to 1 + 3: Thus, the identifying
assumptions for testing the first two predictions are overly severe.
Consider the third prediction, 3 < 0. For a consistent estimate of 3;we require
that if a close tie does not increase the probability of receiving an offer from the
network, then the difference in the unmeasured characteristics of immigrants with
and without a close tie should be independent of whether they happen to find their
job through their network or through formal channels:
E( ijkjNJijk = 1; CTijk = 1; Zijk)  E( ijkjNJijk = 1; CTijk = 0; Zijk) =
E( ijkjNJijk = 0; CTijk = 1; Zijk)  E( ijkjNJijk = 0; CTijk = 0; Zijk) (6)
where Zijk 

Xijk; !
3
j ; 
3
k

:
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In section 6, we discuss scenarios where this maintained assumption may not
hold. We follow this discussion with tests that invalidate these alternative hypothe-
ses.
4 Data
Our data come from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC),
collected by Statistics Canada, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The LSIC
consists of immigrants older than 15 years, who arrived in Canada between October
1, 2000 and September 30, 2001. It is a longitudinal survey with three waves:
immigrants are interviewed at six months, two years and four years since arrival. We
use only the first wave and refer to immigrants in this wave as recent immigrants.
Our target population is principal applicants (persons upon whom the approval to
immigrate was based) and their dependants in the 15 to 64 age group, who are in the
labor force and who live in metropolitan areas in Canada.8 We exclude immigrants
who were in prearranged jobs,9 and those who were self employed or in family
businesses.10 Finally, we limit the analysis to immigrants from metropolitan areas
and from source countries with at least ten immigrants in the LSIC sample.11 The
8A census metropolitan area (CMA), or a census agglomeration (CA), is formed by one or more
adjacent municipalities centered on a large urban core. In the case of a CA, the population of the
urban core is at least 10,000, and in the case of a CMA, it is at least 100,000. CMAs and CAs are
collectively referred to as metropolitan areas.
9When asked about their first jobs, 7.2 percent of the recent immigrants report being in pre-
arranged jobs. We exclude these immigrants from our analysis for two reasons. First, we believe
that the nature of job search for them is fundamentally different from that for those who arrive with-
out a job. Second, immigrants with prearranged jobs are different from other immigrants in terms
of their observed characteristics. They are less likely to have a close tie, be female, be married, and
have kids, but are more likely to be older, know English, have lived in Canada before migration, be
the principal applicant, have an economic visa, and have been a manager or a professional in their
job before migration.
102.1 percent reported being self-employed, and 0.6 percent reported being in family businesses.
11We lose 5.9 percent of the remaining LSIC sample due to this restriction. Reducing this cutoff
below ten resulted in very large standard errors in our quantile regressions that contain country of
birth and metropolitan fixed effects. Later, when we estimate wage regressions conditional on being
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final LSIC estimation sample consists of 6524 recent immigrants, from 64 different
source countries and residing in 23 different metropolitan areas across Canada.12
4.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 presents summary statistics for recent immigrants at six months since ar-
rival. Column (1) shows statistics for the entire cohort, while columns (3) and (4)
condition on whether or not the immigrant has a close tie. 89 percent of the recent
immigrants have a close tie. A network job is one that the respondent reports hav-
ing found through a relative or friend, while a formal job is one found through other
methods such as contacting the employer directly, responding to newspaper adver-
tisements, employment agencies, the internet and referral from another employer
or a union.13 At six months after arrival, 31 percent report their first job to be a
network job, 39 percent report it to be a formal job, and the remaining 31 percent
had not yet found a job. It is interesting to note that while 32 percent of immigrants
with a close tie found their first job using their network, the corresponding figure
for those without a close tie is only 19 percent. Recent immigrants are highly ed-
ucated as 65 percent report having a Bachelor’s or higher degree, and 73 percent
entered Canada on an economic visa. These figures are higher for immigrants with-
out a close tie: 72 percent have a Bachelor’s or higher degree and 87 percent are
on an economic visa. Despite being highly skilled, the average weekly wage for a
recent immigrant in his first job (the earnings measure used in this study) is low:
employed, we further restrict the LSIC estimation sample to include only those immigrants with at
least ten recent immigrants with positive wages from their country of birth, and, separately, with
positive wages in their metropolitan area.
12We keep students in the sample if they report being in the labor force. Students constitute 10.6
percent of the estimation sample.
13The survey questions used to construct the network job variable are as follows:
How did you find this job? 1) Contacted employer directly? 2) Job found by a friend? 3) Job found
by a relative? 4) Placed or answered newspaper ad? 5) Employment agency (including Canada
Employment Centre)? 6) Referral from another employer? 7) Internet? 8) Union? 9) Other? The
response to each question could be either a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’, and it was admissible to answer ‘Yes’
to multiple questions (although only 4 percent of the respondents did so). If the answer to either
question 2 or question 3 was ‘Yes’, then NJ = 1; otherwise NJ = 0.
14
396 Canadian dollars per week.14
Two things must be noted at this point. First, the first job being a network
job (NJ = 1) does not necessarily imply the presence of a close tie (CT = 1),
and vice versa. An immigrant may not have a close tie but may have still found a
network job, perhaps through a friend made after migrating to Canada or through
a relative/friend not living in Canada. Conversely, in spite of the presence of a
close tie, his first job may have been found through formal channels or he may still
be unemployed. Second, the dichotomous measure of ‘use of the social network’
captured by the variable NJ; may not be perfectly related to the theoretical concept
it wishes to encapsulate. For example, suppose that a friend tells me about a job
opening, and I apply and get the job. Do I report that I found the job through a
friend (NJ = 1), or that I applied directly to the employer (NJ = 0)? Thus,
admittedly, our measure of the use of network is imperfect. However, in contrast
with much recent research (e.g. Bayer et al 2008; Dustmann et al 2015; Hellerstein
et al 2011), we measure network use directly and therefore avoid the need to infer
network use from the clustering of immigrants.
5 Main Results
We first provide evidence to support the use of close tie as a valid measure of net-
work strength. Then we report estimates from the difference-in-differences specifi-
cation to test the main implication of our model.
5.1 Close Tie as a Measure of Network Strength
The first three columns of table 2 look at the job search outcome for recent im-
migrants during the first six months since arrival. If the immigrant had multiple
14Use of weekly wage, instead of hourly wage, would have been problematic for our estimations
if the difference in hours worked between network and formal jobs depended on whether or not the
immigrant had a close tie. We check for this and do not find evidence in its support.
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jobs, only his first job is considered. Using a multinomial logit (equation (3)), the
table gives the marginal effects of close tie on the probability of each search out-
come. We find that close tie is strongly related to the first job being a network job.
The presence of a close tie is associated with a 8.6 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of being in a network job (calculated at the means of other independent
variables). It is also associated with a 4.5 percentage point decrease in the likeli-
hood of being in a formal job, and a 4.1 percentage point decrease in the probability
of never being employed, although the latter falls short of statistical significance (p-
value of 0.116). Thus, the relation between job search outcomes and close tie is
broadly consistent with our expectations.
Columns 4 and 5 of table 2 present estimates from quantile regressions at the
50th and 75th percentiles (equation (4)). The dependent variable is the (log) wage
in the immigrant’s first job if he was ever employed during the first six months in
Canada, and it is an assigned low wage if he was never employed during this time.15
The presence of a close tie is associated with 8.6 percent higher wages at the 75th
percentile.16 The magnitude of the effect at the median is 9.6 percent but is not
statistically significant.17
Based on the results in table 2, the close tie measure passes our basic tests. It is
associated with increased job-finding through the network and reduced employment
through formal channels, and the point estimate suggests that it is also associated
15We assigned a wage of exp( 1000) for all those who were never employed. Because 31 percent
of the recent immigrants have never been employed it does not make sense to estimate (4) the
regression at the 25th percentile. Therefore, we only present results for the 50th and 75th percentiles.
Provided that none of the observations with assigned wages are above the conditional quantile being
estimated, the estimated coefficients are invariant to the precise low value assigned.
16The other potential measure of network strength consisting of persons from the immigrant’s
country of origin living in his locality showed a negative coefficient (although statistically insignifi-
cant) at the 75th percentile. We therefore decided not to use it as a valid measure of network strength
(see Goel and Lang 2009 for details).
17Standard errors for these and all other quantile regressions in the paper are calculated using a
clustered bootstrap. Unless otherwise stated bootstrap estimates are based on completed replications
out of 600 draws from 427 metropolitan-country of birth clusters.
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with a lower probability of having never been employed. Moreover, when treating
those who have never been employed as having a low wage, at least at the third
quartile it is also associated with higher wages. Thus, close tie has passed the min-
imal conditions consistent with its interpretation as a measure of network strength
as we conceptualize it.
5.2 Network Premium and Close Tie
Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation (5): conditional on being em-
ployed, the wage equation augmented with our measure of network strength (close
tie, CT ), method of finding the first job (network job, NJ) and the interaction
between these two variables. The dependent variable is the weekly wage in the
immigrant’s first job in Canada obtained within six months of arrival. Column (1)
presents the OLS results, while columns (2) through (10) present quantile regres-
sion results at the nine deciles.
Our model predicts that the mean wage in formal jobs should be increasing in
network strength, while the mean wage in network jobs should be unrelated to it.
As discussed in section 3, assuming that unmeasured individual characteristics are
uncorrelated with close tie is very strong. Nevertheless, for completeness, we men-
tion our results in this regard. Using OLS, the presence of a close tie is associated
with an 9.6 percent increase in the mean formal wage. Further, quantile regres-
sions show that the association between close tie and formal wage is positive at all
deciles, except at the ninth, though it is not always statistically significant. It is
large and statistically significant at the first, second, fourth and fifth deciles.
The effect of network strength on mean network wage is measured by the sum
of the coefficients on close tie, and close tie interacted with network job. There
is no consistent pattern to this estimate. It is positive in OLS, negative at the first
four deciles and positive at the remaining higher deciles. However, in all cases
the estimates are statistically insignificant at conventional levels and are generally
small in absolute value. This suggests that the network wage is independent of the
presence of a close tie.
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For reasons discussed earlier, our main focus is on the interaction term. Our
model predicts that the coefficient on the interaction term is negative at the mean
and at all percentiles (except the highest and the lowest percentiles). Also, our
initial simulations suggest that it may be more negative at percentiles below the
median. For OLS, at the first through the sixth deciles, and at the eighth decile, the
interaction term is negative, as predicted, though not always statistically significant.
Although, the interaction term is positive at the seventh and ninth deciles, in these
cases it is statistically insignificant. Column (3), pertaining to wages at the second
decile conforms closely with the predictions of our model. There is a 25.2 percent
decrease in network premium in the presence of a close tie, and this is statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. There is an 11.4 percent decrease at the fourth decile
and it is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Finally, we bootstrapped a joint
test of the hypothesis that the interaction terms in all nine deciles are zero against
the one-tailed alternative that some are negative. We reject the null at the 0.01 level
of significance. Overall, we find evidence in support of our theory that the network
wage premium is decreasing in network strength.18
6 Alternate Interpretations
In our model, the strength of a network is characterized by the probability with
which it provides a job offer. In other words, we believe that an effective network
influences observed wages by increasing the probability of generating a network
offer. In this subsection, our focus is on scenarios wherein we might confirm our
main testable implication, that the network wage premium decreases with network
strength, even though the principal mechanism through which a stronger network
influences wages is not by an increase in the probability of generating an offer.
Given that our empirical measure of network strength is the presence of a close tie
18At the second decile, we examined the interaction term separately for men, women; high ed-
ucation, low education; 30 and younger and over 30. In all cases the coefficient on the interaction
term was negative, however, bootstrapping the standard errors was unreliable because of the small
sample sizes.
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we address the following concerns: effect of a close tie on the wage-offer distrib-
utions, its effect on the offer probability from formal channels, receiving multiple
network offers, the possibility of sequential search, and worker heterogeneity.
Consider first the potential effects of a close tie on wage-offer distributions. One
possibility is that a close tie worsens the network offer distribution: for example,
if social norms dictate that most new immigrants should work for their relatives,
then the latter may exploit the situation and offer them a low wage. In this case,
the network premium would decrease in network strength, but for a reason different
from the one described in our model. However, note that the observed network wage
distribution would then be worsening in network strength, contradicting prediction
1 in section 2.2 that it is independent of network strength, but recall from section
5.2 that we find no evidence of such an effect. As a further test, we restrict the
sample to those having network jobs and conduct the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of
equality of network wage distributions (conditional on observables) among those
with and without a close tie. Once again, we find no evidence of a difference in these
distributions, making it more plausible that the network premium decreases with
network strength due to the mechanism described in our theoretical model. Another
possibility is that a close tie improves the formal offer distribution by helping the
immigrant figure out the best jobs to which to apply. If this were true, we would
again incorrectly confirm our theory. However, in that case, the presence of a close
tie would imply an increase in the likelihood of being in a job found through formal
channels, something we, again, do not find in our data (as seen in section 5.1).
Second, consider the possible effect of a close tie on the offer probability from
formal channels. Because workers with a close tie expect to receive an offer from
their network, they might endogenously reduce their search effort through formal
channels. This would then reduce the probability of receiving a formal offer, which
would in turn reinforce our prediction. Since this is an endogenous response to the
mechanism we identify, we do not consider it to be problematic.
Yet another possibility is that a close tie increases the probability of receiving
multiple offers from the network. This would result in an improvement in the ef-
fective network offer distribution. At the same time, the distribution of accepted
19
formal offers is still increasing in network strength because of the mechanism we
identify, namely, an increase in the pool of offers to choose from among those ac-
cepting formal source jobs. If the effect of an improvement in the effective network
offer distribution dominates the effect on those accepting formal offers, we would
have failed to confirm our prediction that the network premium falls as network
strength rises.
Another concern is that we consider a single period model and do not allow the
arrival rate of offers to depend on employment status. If search were sequential,
workers’ reservation wages when unemployed might be sensitive to the arrival rate
of offers. It is certainly possible to construct examples in which a higher arrival
rate of offers in one or both states would change the reservation wage while un-
employed. If the offer distributions from the two sources are similar, which our
structural estimates (shown later) suggest they are, changes in the reservation wage
should not greatly affect our results.
Finally, we have considered a group of homogeneous entrants, whereas in real
life they may differ in their skill level. This raises two issues. The first is that
the presence of a close tie might be associated with a network premium for rea-
sons unrelated to an increase in the probability of a network offer. For example,
if the presence of a close tie helps only high-skill immigrants find jobs through
formal channels by helping them navigate the formal job application process, then
the network-formal skill differential would decrease in the presence of a close tie,
and this would lead us to falsely accept our model. However, all such mechanisms
would imply that both network and formal wages are affected by network strength,
which our data do not support. Moreover, the presence of a close tie would imply
an increase in the likelihood of being in a job found through formal channels, again
something we do not find in our data. The second issue is that even if the presence
of a close tie is characterized by an increase in the probability of a network offer for
both low- and high-skill immigrants, it could increase this probability by different
magnitudes for the two groups. If the presence of a close tie increases the probabil-
ity of a network offer for low-skill immigrants by more than it does for high-skill
immigrants, then its presence will lower the mean skill level of immigrants found in
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network jobs by more than it does of immigrants found in formal jobs. This would
then reinforce our prediction that the network premium is decreasing in network
strength. It is important to note that this is not problematic as the mechanism is
endogenous to an increase in the probability of a network offer. On the other hand,
if a close tie increases the probability of a network offer for low-skill immigrants
by less than it does for high-skill immigrants, the change in skill distribution could
obscure the effect of an increase in the probability of a network offer on individual
immigrants and we would falsely reject our model.
We have controlled as much as possible for individual heterogeneity. Never-
theless, it is impossible to know with certainty whether the difference in unmea-
sured heterogeneity between immigrants finding jobs through the two mechanisms
is greatly affected by network strength, and, if it is, whether this “difference-in-
differences” is an endogenous response to the increased probability of a network
offer (in which case it is not problematic) or it reflects factors outside the model.
We undertake two checks to strengthen the case that worker heterogeneity is not
problematic for our investigation.
6.1 Testing for Worker Heterogeneity: Difference-in-
Differences for Observed Characteristics
Table 4 shows the results for a difference-in-differences specification, where an ex-
planatory variable from equation (5) is regressed on close tie, network job and their
interaction. OLS results in columns 1 through 8 show that for eight of the nine
observed characteristics examined in table 4, the network-formal characteristic-
differential does not change with close tie. Column (9) presents the coefficients
from an ordered logit model of educational attainment. The interaction coefficient
is negative, indicating a decrease in network-formal education differential in the
presence of a close tie. This, by itself, does not invalidate our testing strategy; it is
not surprising to find that one of nine coefficients is significant at the .05 level, and
the t-statistic is well below the Bonferroni critical value for nine tests.
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6.2 Testing for Worker Heterogeneity: Excluding Observed
Skills
Here we examine the effect of excluding the observed characteristics from equa-
tion (5). In effect this asks whether an appropriately weighted sum of observed
characteristics is correlated with the interaction term. While the absence of such
a correlation would not guarantee that there is no correlation between unmeasured
characteristics and the interaction, it would make the assumption more plausible.
Table 5 shows the effect of dropping variables that control for skills from the
wage equation. The most important point to note is that the results look quite similar
to those with controls for observed skills.19 In particular, while controlling for skill
makes the coefficient on the interaction term less negative for OLS, it makes it more
negative at the second decile, and both coefficient changes are relatively small in
magnitude. Moreover, it is important to remember that we have an extensive set
of controls for skill. In particular, besides level of education and visa category,
we also control for prior occupation in eight categories and knowledge of English
and French. While it remains possible that there is an important measure of skill
that is correlated with the interaction term, the fact that excluding this extensive set
of controls does not noticeably alter the magnitude of the interaction coefficients,
gives us a reasonable level of confidence in them.
7 Structural Model
Our theoretical model characterizes a stronger network by a higher probability of
generating a network offer and assumes that the network wage-offer distribution
remains unchanged irrespective of whether the network is strong or weak. As dis-
cussed in section 2.3, there could be other ways to characterize a stronger network.
In this section we investigate whether an alternate model, in which network strength
19Also, for the regression at the second decile excluding observed skills, although the interaction
term is not significant at conventional levels, the p value is 0.110.
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is characterized by different network wage-offer distributions, fits the data better.
We build a simple structural model and estimate it using maximum likelihood. This
allows us to uncover the underlying wage-offer distributions and offer probabilities
from each source. The structural estimates provide evidence to support our conclu-
sion that the primary role of a close tie is to increase the likelihood of a network
offer rather than to change the network offer distribution.
We also note that estimating the structural model provides an additional test of
the importance of unmeasured skills for our reduced-form results in table 3: if the
unobserved skills of workers in network jobs depend on whether they have a close
tie, then, this should be reflected as different network offer distributions depending
on whether or not a close tie exists.
7.1 The Model
Once again, we model the first period of a multi-period search process. We assume
that the immigrant receives at most one offer from each source, according to the
following probabilities; pf from the formal channels, ps from his network if it is
strong (in the presence of a close tie) and pw from his network if it is weak (in the
absence of a close tie). Each log wage, !; is drawn from a source specific offer
distribution given by
!ij = Xi + j + "ij; "ij  N(0; 2j) (7)
where i denotes the immigrant and j denotes the source (formal channels f , strong
network s; and weak network w). Thus, j is a source-specific factor shifting the
mean of the offer distribution. We also allow the variance of the error, 2j , to vary
across sources. We assume that the errors are independent across i and j.
To derive the likelihood function, note that the probability that a worker with a
strong network (CT = 1) is unemployed (u) is,
LF (ujCT = 1) = (1  pf )(1  ps) (8)
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and the probability that a worker with a weak network is unemployed is,
LF (ujCT = 0) = (1  pf )(1  pw) (9)
The probability that a worker with a strong network is earning a given wage (!)
and is working in a network job (NJ = 1) is,
LF (!;NJ = 1jCT = 1) =

ps

(1  pf ) + pf

s   f + "is
f

s("is)
(10)
The last term, s("is), is the standard normal density of the network offer when the
network is strong. The term in square brackets is the probability of receiving and
accepting a network offer when the network is strong. This is itself a product of the
probability of receiving a network offer when the network is strong (ps), and the
probability of either not receiving a formal offer (1   pf ), or receiving an inferior
formal offer (pf /), where  is the standard normal c.d.f. and is derived by noting
that the formal offer is rejected if it is less than the network offer. Thus  is the
probability that
Xi + f + "if < Xi + s + "is (11)
or
Pr(
"if
f
<
s   f + "is
f
j"is) where "if
f
 N(0; 1) (12)
with the errors independent across the sources.
The probability of earning a given wage and working in a network job when
the network is weak, and the probabilities of formal employment when the network
is strong and weak, can be similarly expressed. Taking logs and summing across
observations gives the log likelihood function which we maximize with respect to
the offer probabilities (pf ; ps; pw), and the means and standard deviations of the
offer distributions (j; j)
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7.2 Structural Parameter Estimates
The first column of table 6 gives the results of estimating the most flexible spec-
ification, wherein we allow the network offer distribution to depend on network
strength, and also allow the formal offer distribution to differ from the network
distributions. We estimate that formal channels provide an offer with probability
0.47. Strong and weak networks do so with probabilities, 0.45 and 0.25, respec-
tively, which are significantly different from each other. This suggests that of the
immigrants with a strong network (those with a close tie), about 21 percent get
two offers, and about 29 percent get no offers. In contrast, of the immigrants with a
weak network (those without a close tie), about 12 percent get two offers and nearly
40 percent get no offers. The means of the three distributions are quite similar.20
The residual variances of the network offer distributions are somewhat, but not dra-
matically lower, compared to that of formal channels. More importantly, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the means of the strong and weak network offer distrib-
utions are the same (t = 1:3), nor the hypothesis that their standard deviations are
the same (t =  1:2). Therefore, in the second column, we restrict the network
offer distributions to be the same irrespective of network strength. Comparing the
log-likelihood values in the first two columns, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the network offer distribution is independent of network strength (2(2) = 3:06).
This provides strong evidence for our conclusion that the presence of a close tie
primarily influences wages by increasing the probability of generating a network
offer, rather than by influencing the network offer distribution. As mentioned at
the start of this section, the result that there is a single network offer distribution
irrespective of whether the network is strong or weak also makes it less likely that
differences in unmeasured skills are driving the results in table 3.
In column (2), the means of the network and formal offer distributions are not
statistically different from each other. Although their standard deviations are statis-
tically different, the numerical values differ only modestly from each other. Finally
20Note that the level of the means is arbitrary. These are essentially constant terms in a regression
where the effects of the explanatory variables have been constrained to be the same across the three
distributions.
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in the last column we restrict the network and formal offer distributions to be the
same. Comparing the log-likelihood values in columns (2) and (3), this hypoth-
esis is rejected (2(2) = 52:03), though from column (2) we know that the two
distributions only marginally differ from each other.
Thus the results of the structural model are very much in line with our theoret-
ical model: network strength, captured by the presence of a close tie, is associated
with a greater likelihood of receiving an offer from the network. It is not associated
with a large alteration of the network offer distribution.
Using the structural parameter estimates from column (2) of table 6, we also
simulate the network wage premium, at the mean and at various deciles. This
allows us to examine whether the results in table 3 can be reproduced using our
structural parameter estimates of the underlying offer distributions and offer prob-
abilities. The results are mixed.21 On the one hand, for both the mean and each
decile, the simulated coefficient on “Network Job*Close Tie” always falls within
the confidence interval of the coefficient reported in table 3. On the other hand, the
magnitude of the simulated interaction coefficients at the three lowest deciles is no-
ticeably smaller than in table 3. This may indicate that network strength increases
the likelihood of a low-wage offer, but the structural model does not have sufficient
power to detect this effect.
8 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we draw on Montgomery (1992) to develop a theoretical model that
describes how social networks operate in the job search process. We model the
strength of a worker’s network by the likelihood with which it provides him a job
offer. Considering that a worker can find a job either through his network or through
the formal (non-network) channels, we show that the network-formal wage differ-
ential is decreasing in network strength.
21Simulation results available on request.
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We test this implication on a nationally representative sample of recent immi-
grants to Canada. In the data, the presence of a ‘close tie’ (at least one relative or
friend already living in Canada at the time of the immigrant’s arrival), captures the
concept of a stronger network as we have defined it. Using a standard difference-in-
differences approach, we find that the network premium decreases with the presence
of a close tie, thus confirming that close ties operate by increasing the probability
of receiving a network offer. As we suggested was likely to be the case, evidence in
favor of our model is especially strong at the lower end of the observed wage distri-
bution (first four deciles). This might appear to suggest that close ties particularly
increase the likelihood of low-wage offers, but we have shown this to be incorrect.
We estimate a simple structural version of the model that confirms that the pri-
mary role of close ties is to increase the probability of generating a wage offer from
the network rather than to alter the distribution from which an offer is drawn. These
estimates also suggest that the network and formal offer distributions differ only
modestly, so that Montgomery’s (1992) model, which relies on network and formal
offer distributions being identical, may be applied to the data.
It is often argued that immigrants tend to cluster together because the presence
of established immigrants facilitates assimilation of new arrivals, both in the la-
bor market and in the social environment of the host country. We find that social
networks, as embodied in relatives and friends already living in the host country,
help recent immigrants find their first jobs. The mechanism through which such
networks operate is by providing a larger number of job offers. Our analysis also
suggests that such close ties do not influence the kind of job offers that immigrants
receive. In other words, in the absence of close ties, recent immigrants would re-
ceive fewer offers, but the offers they do receive would be neither better nor worse
than those they would have received had such ties been present. We have not ad-
dressed other issues related to immigrant assimilation, including the longer term
labor market effects of social networks.
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Table 1: Recent Immigrants to Canada (at six months since arrival)
All Recent Immigrants Without Close Tie With Close Tie
Mean (Std. Dev.) Sample Size Mean (Std. Dev.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network Strength Measure
Close Tie (CT ) 0.89 6524
Job Outcomes
First Job is Network Job 0.31 6524 0.19 0.32
First Job is Formal Job 0.39 6524 0.44 0.38
Never Employed 0.31 6524 0.38 0.30
Weekly Wage in First Job (CAD) 396 (275) 4318 405 (347) 395 (266)
Explanatory Variables
Female 0.43 6524 0.43 0.43
Age 34 (9) 6524 33 (8) 34 (9)
Married 0.76 6524 0.75 0.76
Number of children 0.83 (1.03) 6524 0.85 (0.99) 0.83 (1.03)
Speaks English Well 0.65 6524 0.63 0.65
Speaks French Well 0.12 6524 0.12 0.11
Lived in Canada Before 0.05 6524 0.06 0.05
Principal Applicant 0.68 6524 0.61 0.68
Education
Less than High School 0.09 6488 0.06 0.09
High School 0.09 6488 0.06 0.10
Some College 0.05 6488 0.04 0.05
College 0.13 6488 0.13 0.12
Bachelor 0.43 6488 0.47 0.42
Master and above 0.22 6488 0.25 0.21
Visa Category
Economic Visa 0.73 6456 0.87 0.71
Family Visa 0.23 6456 0.07 0.25
Refugee Visa 0.04 6456 0.05 0.04
Occupation before migrating
Manager 0.02 6478 0.02 0.02
Professional 0.35 6478 0.38 0.35
Paraprofessional 0.13 6478 0.12 0.13
Clerical 0.02 6478 0.02 0.02
Laborer 0.002 6478 0.00 0.002
New Worker 0.23 6478 0.20 0.24
Student 0.10 6478 0.09 0.10
None 0.14 6478 0.16 0.14
LSIC sample has been appropriately weighted to reflect statistics for the target population.
Variation in the sample size (column 2) is due to differences in missing data across variables.
Weekly wage is only reported for those who were ever employed within the first six months.
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Table 2: Validating Close Tie as a measure of Network Strength
Multinomial Logit (MNL) Marginal Effects1 (log) Wage Regression4
(at means of independent variables) (low wage imputed to the never employed)
Formal Job2 Network Job2 Never Employed 50th Percentile 75th Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Close Tie -0.045*** 0.086*** -0.041 0.096 0.086**
[0.018] [0.023] [0.026] [0.089] [0.036]
Observations 6374 5964 5964
Clusters3 545 427 427
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 using two-tailed tests
1Full specification includes the ‘Explanatory Variables’ described in table 1, metropolitan dummies and country of birth dummies.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the metropolitan-country of birth level, are shown within brackets.
2Refers to the first job.
3Refers to metropolitan-country of birth groups
4Full specification consists of all variables used in the MNL. Standard errors are obtained using clustered bootstrap where
replications are based on metropolitan-country of birth clusters.
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Table 3: Network Premium and Close Tie
(Log) Wage Regression (conditional on being employed)
OLS1 Quantile Regressions at various deciles2
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Close Tie 0.096* 0.256** 0.241*** 0.102 0.090* 0.083** 0.049 0.035 0.076 -0.016
[0.052] [0.127] [0.086] [0.084] [0.048] [0.041] [0.037] [0.043] [0.058] [0.086]
Network Job 0.052 0.329* 0.264** 0.139 0.107* 0.040 -0.026 -0.040 -0.016 -0.204**
[0.076] [0.171] [0.118] [0.101] [0.058] [0.051] [0.050] [0.071] [0.072] [0.089]
Network Job*Close Tie -0.090 -0.287 -0.252** -0.142 -0.112* -0.060 -0.004 0.001 -0.066 0.072
[0.085] [0.198] [0.126] [0.103] [0.059] [0.051] [0.049] [0.072] [0.080] [0.090]
Observations 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 using two-tailed tests. Full specification includes the ‘Explanatory Variables’ described in table 1,
metropolitan dummies and country of birth dummies.
1Standard errors clustered at metropolitan-country of birth level, R squared is 0.18
2Standard errors are obtained using clustered bootstrap where replications are based on 358 metropolitan-country of birth clusters.
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Table 4: Difference in Differences for Observed Characteristics
OLS Ordered Logistic
Coefficients
Female Age Married No. of Speaks Speaks Lived in Principal Education
children English French Can. Before Applicant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Close Tie 0.015 0.359 0.018 0.027 0.077* -0.013 0.003 0.072** -0.260**
[0.028] [0.545] [0.027] [0.065] [0.043] [0.037] [0.012] [0.036] [0.108]
Network Job 0.081 0.596 0.016 0.106 -0.128** -0.036 -0.016 -0.075 -0.490***
[0.059] [1.024] [0.039] [0.079] [0.049] [0.053] [0.021] [0.046] [0.166]
Network Job*Close Tie -0.069 -0.376 -0.030 -0.041 -0.053 -0.008 -0.007 0.029 -0.441**
[0.065] [0.870] [0.040] [0.088] [0.046] [0.048] [0.022] [0.049] [0.204]
Observations 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094 4094
R-squared 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.035 0.006 0.003 0.005
Log Pseudolikelihood -90111.573
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 using two-tailed tests; Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the metropolitan-country
of birth level (358 clusters).
35
Table 5: Skill Bias Check: (Log) Wage Regression (conditional on being employed)
OLS2 Quantile Regression, third decile3
All Controls1 Excluding All Controls1 Excluding
Observed Skills Observed Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Close Tie 0.096* 0.093* 0.241*** 0.264***
[0.052] [0.052] [0.086] [0.099]
Network Job 0.052 0.039 0.264** 0.226*
[0.076] [0.073] [0.118] [0.126]
Network Job*Close Tie -0.090 -0.100 -0.252** -0.214
[0.085] [0.085] [0.126] [0.134]
Language skills Yes No Yes No
Visa category Yes No Yes No
Occupation before migrating Yes No Yes No
Education level Yes No Yes No
R-squared 0.18 0.16
Clusters 358 358 358 358
Observations 4094 4094 4094 4094
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 using two-tailed tests. Unless specified, full specification includes
1
‘All Controls’ includes the ‘Explanatory Variables’ described in table 1, metropolitan dummies and
country of birth dummies.
2Standard errors clustered at metropolitan-country of birth level
3Standard errors are obtained using clustered bootstrap where replications are based on
metropolitan-country of birth clusters.
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Table 6: Structural Parameter Estimates of Offer Probabilities and (Log) Wage-Offer Distributions
Source Specific Identical Network Single Offer
Offer Distributions1 Offer Distributions2 Distribution3
(1) (2) (3)
Probability formal offer 0.47 0.47 0.47
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Probability network offer (strong) 0.45 0.45 0.45
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Probability network offer (weak) 0.25 0.24 0.24
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean formal offer distribution 5.25 5.25 5.26
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Std. dev. formal offer distribution 0.67 0.67 0.63
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mean network offer distribution (strong) 5.25 5.24 Not Applicable
(0.20) (0.20)
Std. dev. network offer distribution (strong) 0.57 0.57 Not Applicable
(0.01) (0.01)
Mean network offer distribution (weak) 5.17 Not Applicable Not Applicable
(0.20)
Std. dev. network offer distribution (weak) 0.62 Not Applicable Not Applicable
(0.04)
Log-likelihood -10296.47 -10298 -10324.02
Standard errors in parentheses.
1Each source allowed to have its own specific offer distribution
2Offer distributions from weak networks and strong networks constrained to be identical
3All offer distributions constrained to be identical
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